At the June 14, 2009 HSG, Scott Brewer, a professor at Harvard Law School, will offer a description of a course that he teaches in Harvard College in the "Core"curriculum, "Trust, Vision, and Doubt in Ethics, Politics, and Law." The course description (as it appears in the Harvard course catalogue) appearsbelow. At least three aspects of this course may be of interest to Humanists, and these will be the focus of Scott's presentation: (i) The basic framework of "trust, vision, and doubt"; (ii) the way in which this course seeks to recover the tradition of "philosophy as a way of life" (and not only as a set of rigorous analytical tools for reflection and analysis)-- a tradition that dominated ancient eastern and western philosophy butthat also became lost in Western philosophy as philosophy entered thecurriculum of the medieval university; (iii) a focus in the course on three importantly distinct types of doubt: the kind of doubt that is central to the methodology of science and fact-finding in law, the kind of doubt advanced by philosophical skeptics, and the kind of doubt that is involved in "unmasking" ideals or institutions to show or argue that high ideals are actually motivated by less-than-noble motives.
"Moral Reasoning 82 : Trust, Vision, and Doubt in Ethics, Politics, and Law. This course explores the interplay of trust, vision, justification and doubt in ethical, political, and legal thought. It examines how some of the characteristic moral, political and legal faiths of the last few centuries have been transformed under the pressure of skepticism or of a crisis of faith. In this way, it introduces students to the problems and opportunities of reasoning in all the normative disciplines."
Tuesday, June 9, 2009
Monday, May 11, 2009
On Goodness and the Contemplative Life
An interesting question came up at our last HSG session regarding the moral worth of the inner life. Would we as Humanists consider a hermit, monk, sanyasi, mystic, or other person devoted to a contemplative life with little interaction with other human beings, a good person? Apparently some thought such a person was an ethically neutral being, basing assessment of his goodness purely on his interactions with others or the lack thereof, with no points for truth-seeking and right belief.
I mentioned that Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism all provide high esteem for monasticism, including material and/or institutional support. I wasn’t too sure about Judaism and Islam.
Judaism does have Haredim in Israel who function like monks, except that they marry and have large families. The men, however, do not work and do not help the women with child-rearing, devoting themselves instead to religious study and prayer. The state of Israel exempts the Haredim from the military service demanded of other Jews and allows them to ask others for money at Israel’s holy sites, in the fashion of mendicants in other religious traditions. The Haredim claim that their relentless prayer enhances Israel’s security. Islam does have Sufi mystics and dervishes, although they too marry and have families because of the Koranic injunction against celibacy. I’m not sure what the status of Sufism would be under Islam, as I’m not aware of any official approval of it as the Haredim have from the state of Israel.
Another participant brought up the idea that many university researchers in impractical areas constitute a type of secular monk, devoted to the pursuit of truth and knowledge with as little concern for improving the human condition materially or in terms of social justice as the medieval monks who wondered how many angels could fit on a pinhead.
I’m not sure how these various types of monks could be viewed as neutral when they do take up resources. Churches and monasteries collected food and money from peasants to support such monks. The monks’ time, the religious institutions’ money, or ordinary people’s money could have been applied to alleviate poverty and so forth.
My own opinion is that the monk or contemplative person could be a good person because truth-seeking, right beliefs, self-awareness, control and moderation of desires, maintaining good physical and mental health, and the full development of personality possible only through a break from reactions to others, are moral virtues.
If the leaders of a society cannot emphasize these virtues, the leaders become disconnected from reality. Their good intentions of helping others are less likely to have the intended effects, because they lack the passion to see things as they are, preferring instead to connect emotionally to other people and by implication some quotidian, undeveloped sense of reality.
I mentioned that Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism all provide high esteem for monasticism, including material and/or institutional support. I wasn’t too sure about Judaism and Islam.
Judaism does have Haredim in Israel who function like monks, except that they marry and have large families. The men, however, do not work and do not help the women with child-rearing, devoting themselves instead to religious study and prayer. The state of Israel exempts the Haredim from the military service demanded of other Jews and allows them to ask others for money at Israel’s holy sites, in the fashion of mendicants in other religious traditions. The Haredim claim that their relentless prayer enhances Israel’s security. Islam does have Sufi mystics and dervishes, although they too marry and have families because of the Koranic injunction against celibacy. I’m not sure what the status of Sufism would be under Islam, as I’m not aware of any official approval of it as the Haredim have from the state of Israel.
Another participant brought up the idea that many university researchers in impractical areas constitute a type of secular monk, devoted to the pursuit of truth and knowledge with as little concern for improving the human condition materially or in terms of social justice as the medieval monks who wondered how many angels could fit on a pinhead.
I’m not sure how these various types of monks could be viewed as neutral when they do take up resources. Churches and monasteries collected food and money from peasants to support such monks. The monks’ time, the religious institutions’ money, or ordinary people’s money could have been applied to alleviate poverty and so forth.
My own opinion is that the monk or contemplative person could be a good person because truth-seeking, right beliefs, self-awareness, control and moderation of desires, maintaining good physical and mental health, and the full development of personality possible only through a break from reactions to others, are moral virtues.
If the leaders of a society cannot emphasize these virtues, the leaders become disconnected from reality. Their good intentions of helping others are less likely to have the intended effects, because they lack the passion to see things as they are, preferring instead to connect emotionally to other people and by implication some quotidian, undeveloped sense of reality.
Sunday, April 26, 2009
Boston Globe Ideas section: religion research studies the secular
This is a pretty good article; evidently according to new possibly biased research, convinced atheists may be as likely to be happy as ardent believers. Though I don't think they did their homework about how groups like the Templeton Foundation are really about advocacy rather than research.
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/04/26/beyond_belief/?page=full
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/04/26/beyond_belief/?page=full
Monday, April 20, 2009
Freethinking Felons?
I recently saw a YouTube interview with Hemant Mehta, wherein he talked about a program of distributing freethought, atheistic literature to prison inmates to counter all the religious literature with which churches bombard these folks.
I recalled that at one of our Humanist Small Group sessions we had wondered if Humanism/skepticism was useful for everyone, with a concern that perhaps religion offerred the solace that worse-off people needed.
Do violent criminals need to be freed from moralistic dogma and repression? Or do we assume a certain type of personality and development in our audience when we seek to spread Humanism/freethinking?
I recalled that at one of our Humanist Small Group sessions we had wondered if Humanism/skepticism was useful for everyone, with a concern that perhaps religion offerred the solace that worse-off people needed.
Do violent criminals need to be freed from moralistic dogma and repression? Or do we assume a certain type of personality and development in our audience when we seek to spread Humanism/freethinking?
Tuesday, April 7, 2009
Thoughts on Death
I recently attended an atheist/nonreligious parenting seminar in which the speaker (Dale McGowan) raised the topic of how to depict death to nonreligious children. His approach was to describe it as returning to nonexistence, as before one’s birth; a few seminar participants agreed with this construct.
I found this depiction far too materialist. In the atheistic fervor to deny the existence of a soul that transmigrates after death, the approach reduces an individual or the Self more or less to a physical person.
For me, the Self is mostly a combination of experiences and interactions with an outside world, including other people, with the acknowledgment that my physical body is the venue through which those reactions take place. A similar type or tone of experience or interaction with an outer world would presumably continue for other individuals after I die. While those individuals may be very different from me because the world/environment that they inhabit is quite different from the one I lived through and left, I myself in the same physical body have become a very different person than I was in the past, partly because the world has changed and partly due to new experiences of existing realities.
Returning to the commentary at the parenting seminar, one participant objected to the depiction of death as returning to non-existence, by pointing out that those individuals who have children continue their physiological existence through their offspring, who would not have existed “but-for” the existence of their parents.
Certainly our ability to reproduce does appear to be Nature’s answer to our physical mortality, but I found this construct far too materialist and simplistic also. Again the Self is reduced to a physical person, just adding acknowledgement of our reproductive functions.
The idea raises more questions than it answers. Do we continue our own existence through a child because that person is our physical offspring, or do we continue our own existence through a child because we have raised that person consistent with our own values? If the latter, why aren’t we continuing our own existence every time we impart our values, e.g., as teachers, peers, and so forth?
How you feel about death necessarily seems to involve the issue of how you conceptualize your existing in the first place.
Perhaps more later . . .
I found this depiction far too materialist. In the atheistic fervor to deny the existence of a soul that transmigrates after death, the approach reduces an individual or the Self more or less to a physical person.
For me, the Self is mostly a combination of experiences and interactions with an outside world, including other people, with the acknowledgment that my physical body is the venue through which those reactions take place. A similar type or tone of experience or interaction with an outer world would presumably continue for other individuals after I die. While those individuals may be very different from me because the world/environment that they inhabit is quite different from the one I lived through and left, I myself in the same physical body have become a very different person than I was in the past, partly because the world has changed and partly due to new experiences of existing realities.
Returning to the commentary at the parenting seminar, one participant objected to the depiction of death as returning to non-existence, by pointing out that those individuals who have children continue their physiological existence through their offspring, who would not have existed “but-for” the existence of their parents.
Certainly our ability to reproduce does appear to be Nature’s answer to our physical mortality, but I found this construct far too materialist and simplistic also. Again the Self is reduced to a physical person, just adding acknowledgement of our reproductive functions.
The idea raises more questions than it answers. Do we continue our own existence through a child because that person is our physical offspring, or do we continue our own existence through a child because we have raised that person consistent with our own values? If the latter, why aren’t we continuing our own existence every time we impart our values, e.g., as teachers, peers, and so forth?
How you feel about death necessarily seems to involve the issue of how you conceptualize your existing in the first place.
Perhaps more later . . .
Thursday, March 19, 2009
Militants vs. Integrationists?
The National Journal's cover story, Rise of the Godless, includes this gossipy passage
The Malcolm X vs MLK metaphor certainly brings out the fault lines, but to the disadvantage of the "militants" in the sense that Martin Luther King is an icon and even has a paid holiday named after him while Malcolm X remains controversial.
I'm not sure that it's a correct description of the dynamic, either. I would agree that "militants" like the Four Horsemen, (Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens, and Sam Harris) are eager to engage in verbal combat with the religious. But I don't think that the motivation of the "integrationists" is to act politely and make nice so religious people will like non-believers.
I'm not even sure who the "integrationists" are that the article refers to, although E.O Wilson and Greg Epstein probably belong in that camp.
Rather, the "integrationists" don't see the question of whether God exists or not, and whether religions should exist or not, to be the central question of our time. Instead, "integrationists" have defined certain goals relating to human beings and other species as central, and are willing to work in coalition on a pragmatic basis with whomever they can to achieve those humanistic goals.
Of course, there is common ground between the "militants" and the "integrationists" both in that irrational beliefs, which are inherently noxious to the "militants," are also to the "integrationists" a source of bad policy. For instance, the coalition that denies global warming seems to be primarily made up of fossil-fuel businesses in coalition with the religious right. There is no inherent reason why the religious right should take this view, but their disbelief in evolution makes them prone to disbelieve other things that scientists say. What the Pope has to say about transubstantiation more be no more rational than his claim that condoms don't help in the fight against AIDS but it's the latter that is demonstrably hurtful, and easier convince people who might otherwise believe in dogma to repudiate.
In general, policy positions that derive from a 2000-year-old book are likely to be behind the times. To the extent that irrational beliefs cause tangible harm, they should clearly be opposed. But its an open question whether its more effective to focus on the specific harmful belief or try to overturn the believers entire belief system.
Still, for "integrationists" there is a question of how to react when anti-religious rhetoric upsets religious people.
For instance, with regard to the incendiary Danish cartoons of Muhammad, the "integrationist" is disinclined to deeply offend the beliefs of the religionist. But if a "militant" happens to do so, the "integrationist" is, I think, duty-bound to defend the right to free expression (and life) of the "militant." That's a time when "militants" and "integrationists" have to stand together.
The Secular Coalition is showing growing pangs. In mid-January, its director, Lori Lipman Brown, abruptly departed after more than three years on the job. Silverman, the president, said that by this point it "has gone beyond what we even thought it would be" and that "the managing wasn't going as efficiently as we wanted."
Brown, for her part, said, "The job morphed out of what I really enjoy doing": working on policy issues, for one thing. Asked to name the secular movement's central challenge at this point, she said, "There are people who want to focus more on explaining their conclusion about whether there is a deity than making the country feel comfortable and safe for people like themselves."
That comment touches on an unresolved tension at the grassroots level, between the movement's Malcolm X-type militants, eager to engage in pitched battle with the religious-minded on the other side of the barricade, and Martin Luther King-type integrationists, bent on engagement with the religious community in a bid to win hearts and minds.
The Malcolm X vs MLK metaphor certainly brings out the fault lines, but to the disadvantage of the "militants" in the sense that Martin Luther King is an icon and even has a paid holiday named after him while Malcolm X remains controversial.
I'm not sure that it's a correct description of the dynamic, either. I would agree that "militants" like the Four Horsemen, (Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Christopher Hitchens, and Sam Harris) are eager to engage in verbal combat with the religious. But I don't think that the motivation of the "integrationists" is to act politely and make nice so religious people will like non-believers.
I'm not even sure who the "integrationists" are that the article refers to, although E.O Wilson and Greg Epstein probably belong in that camp.
Rather, the "integrationists" don't see the question of whether God exists or not, and whether religions should exist or not, to be the central question of our time. Instead, "integrationists" have defined certain goals relating to human beings and other species as central, and are willing to work in coalition on a pragmatic basis with whomever they can to achieve those humanistic goals.
Of course, there is common ground between the "militants" and the "integrationists" both in that irrational beliefs, which are inherently noxious to the "militants," are also to the "integrationists" a source of bad policy. For instance, the coalition that denies global warming seems to be primarily made up of fossil-fuel businesses in coalition with the religious right. There is no inherent reason why the religious right should take this view, but their disbelief in evolution makes them prone to disbelieve other things that scientists say. What the Pope has to say about transubstantiation more be no more rational than his claim that condoms don't help in the fight against AIDS but it's the latter that is demonstrably hurtful, and easier convince people who might otherwise believe in dogma to repudiate.
In general, policy positions that derive from a 2000-year-old book are likely to be behind the times. To the extent that irrational beliefs cause tangible harm, they should clearly be opposed. But its an open question whether its more effective to focus on the specific harmful belief or try to overturn the believers entire belief system.
Still, for "integrationists" there is a question of how to react when anti-religious rhetoric upsets religious people.
For instance, with regard to the incendiary Danish cartoons of Muhammad, the "integrationist" is disinclined to deeply offend the beliefs of the religionist. But if a "militant" happens to do so, the "integrationist" is, I think, duty-bound to defend the right to free expression (and life) of the "militant." That's a time when "militants" and "integrationists" have to stand together.
Monday, March 2, 2009
Stoic Youtube
We also talked about making Humanist Youtube videos. Well, there is a Stoic Registry that does something similar for the philosophy of Stoicism. I'm not endorsing these, but just presenting them for discussion
Sunday, March 1, 2009
Witchfinders
This book by Malcolm Gaskill tels the story of the witch hunts of the 1640s in East Anglia, the part of England from which may Puritans emigrated to New England. The English towns where witches were hunted have names like Ipswich and Chelmsford that are familiar to Massachusetts residents. This English witch hunt took place about two generations before the Salem witch trials and was more extensive. Taking place during the English Civil War, when Puritans feared enemies within and without, more than 100 "witches" were hanged. In many cases, the "evidence" for witchcraft was confessions made after sleep deprivation.
Why Are We Self-Aware?
My friend, Wintery Knight, who is an evangelical Christian, forwarded me an e-mail from the Intelligent Design advocates at the Discovery Institute that links to an NPR story between ID advocate Michael Egnor and skeptic Steven Novella.
I'd rather the mind/brain problem not become a new front in the culture war because it may harden viewpoints in a way that limits the freethinking necessary to solve a problem, the answer to which must be vastly at odds with our normal intuitions or we would have figured it out by now.
Egnor makes assumptions about the existence of freewill and a self, and then argues that materialism cannot support them, so materialism is wrong. But belief in freewill is not universal among religions, and Buddhists certainly would not agree with Egnor's views of a self. For Egnor, his beliefs come first, and science second.
Novella, on the other hand, does put science first, but he seems to be something of a hegemonist when it comes to the quantitative sciences. In his dismissal of the philosophical question of qualia, why mind has the feel that it does, he seems to be saying that if you can't measure it, it does not exist.
I think it's quite likely that in the coming century, we will have a complete understanding of the neural correlates of consciousness, and the role of every neural circuit and neurotransmitter, and still not be able to answer the question, why consciousness feel like it does, why are we self-aware.
I'd rather the mind/brain problem not become a new front in the culture war because it may harden viewpoints in a way that limits the freethinking necessary to solve a problem, the answer to which must be vastly at odds with our normal intuitions or we would have figured it out by now.
Egnor makes assumptions about the existence of freewill and a self, and then argues that materialism cannot support them, so materialism is wrong. But belief in freewill is not universal among religions, and Buddhists certainly would not agree with Egnor's views of a self. For Egnor, his beliefs come first, and science second.
Novella, on the other hand, does put science first, but he seems to be something of a hegemonist when it comes to the quantitative sciences. In his dismissal of the philosophical question of qualia, why mind has the feel that it does, he seems to be saying that if you can't measure it, it does not exist.
I think it's quite likely that in the coming century, we will have a complete understanding of the neural correlates of consciousness, and the role of every neural circuit and neurotransmitter, and still not be able to answer the question, why consciousness feel like it does, why are we self-aware.
Evangelism
The Humanist Small Group met today in Cambridge, and discussed how to communicate more about what Humanism is to those who don't know about it. One point we discussed was to revive this blog, which has had little activity and never had a vigorous back and forth.
I'm going to be working on a makeover of this blog, but in the meantime, there will be most postings, and I hope more discussion. Comments are an integral part of the discussion, and what makes it worthwhile for the posters, so please add your voice to the posts that come.
I'm going to be working on a makeover of this blog, but in the meantime, there will be most postings, and I hope more discussion. Comments are an integral part of the discussion, and what makes it worthwhile for the posters, so please add your voice to the posts that come.
Wednesday, January 14, 2009
"The bad news is that there is probably no God. The good news is that we don't need him."
A european bus tour organized by the Union of Atheists and Rationalist Agnosticists is championing agnostic philosophy! After London and Barcelona, it is now heading to Genoa...
Saturday, December 6, 2008
Happy birthday!
Happy birthday to you Sisters and Brothers of the world!If the age of reason for a child happens when she suddenly becomes aware of herself within her kin, then maybe the human kind took its first steps in this age on Dec. 10th 1948--not so long ago...
On Dec. 10th 1948, in response to too much pain endured in too little time, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Article 1. - All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Does this mean we suddenly started to be good to one another? Does this mean we now empathize with the sufferings of our kin? Does this mean we found answers to the questions that have been haunting us for centuries?
Probably not. It does mean, however, that we, as a collective, chose to look at ourselves in the mirror. We may not like what we will see. But at least, we promise to do better. Well, some of us did... Let them be examples for us all.
Thursday, November 20, 2008
Darwin 200: News Special
"Next year will be the 200th anniversary of the birth of Charles Robert Darwin, perhaps the most influential scientist of modern times. In that time, no single scientist has matched Darwin’s combined impact on the natural and social sciences; on politics, religions, and philosophy; on art and cultural relations, and in ways that the man himself would never have imagined.In this Nature News special, the world’s leading scientific journal will bring together news, research and analysis of Darwin, his life, his science and his legacy. This special will be updated throughout 2009 with news, opinion, podcasts, events, the latest research and free educational resources."
Saturday, November 1, 2008
Harvard Humanist Small Group
Sunday, November 02, 2008
Notes and Discussion Questions for Plato's Apology and Euthyphro
(prepared by Scott Brewer)
What exactly is the "Socratic method"?: the structure of the "elenchos" ("cross-examination")
1. Interlocutor asserts a definition of a virtue, d
2. Socrates secures agreement to further premises, q and r
3. Socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that q and r entail not-d
4. Socrates claims that not-d has been proved
Examples of Socratic Method: elenchoi in the Euthyphro
First try, first elenchos: "This what I'm doing here is holiness"
d: 'What E is doing' (prosecuting father) is a definition of 'holiness'
e: Many other things apart from what E is doing (prosecuting father) are also holy.
· Structure of the first elenchos (modus tollens reductio):
d is proposed by E
S elicits, If d then not-e [or, equivalently, if e then not-d]
S elicits e
S concludes, therefore, not-d
Second try, second elenchos: "What is dear to the gods is holy and what is not dear to the gods is unholy."
d: 'What is dear to the gods is holy and what is not dear to the gods is unholy' is a
definition of 'holy'.
r: Human beings get into angry disagreement (only) concerning what is right and
wrong, noble or disgraceful, good and bad. (7D)
s: Gods get into angry disagreement (only) concerning what is right and wrong,
noble or disgraceful, good and bad. (7E)
t: The same things are both hated and loved by the gods (as a group). (8a [because
some gods love X while other gods hate X, hence, their angry disagreement.])
u: The same things are holy and unholy.
· Structure of the second elenchos (modus tollens reductio)
d is proposed by E
S elicits r, s, t
S argues that if r, s, and t are true, then u is true
S argues that if u is true, then d is not true
S concludes not-d
Third try, third elenchos: "What all the gods love is holy, what all the gods hate is unholy" (and what they disagree about is both or neither? – see 9D - E)
d: What all the gods love is holy, what all the gods hate is unholy.
r1 . . . r5 (S explains the question by securing E's agreement to r1 . . . r5 : "Because
it's Xi it's an Xi thing.")
a thing is "a carried thing" (r1) because one carries it -- it's not the case that one carries it because it is a carried thing.
ditto for 'led' (r2), 'seen' (r3 ), 'done or undergone' (r4), 'loved' (r5) (10C [Those who love something do not love it because it's beloved, but it's beloved because they love it])
à Note that these are all participles, i.e., "verbal adjectives" (in both Greek and English).
s: what is holy is what is loved by all the gods because it's holy, not: what is holy
is holy because it's loved by the gods. (10E)
à Cf. the debate between "moral realism" and "moral relativism": an act is judged wrong because it is wrong, apart from judgment (realism) vs. an act is wrong because it's judged wrong.
à Basically, Socrates suggests, and Euthyphro agrees to, a "moral realist" position about holiness and the gods, rather than a moral relativist position.
t: what is loved by (all the) the gods is beloved because they love it, not: they love
it because it's beloved (10E);
cf. 10C, those who love something do not love it because it's "beloved," but it's "beloved" because they love it.
· Structure of the third elenchos (modus tollens reductio)
E proposes d as definition of 'holy'
S elicits, secures E's agreement that r1 . . . r5, s, and t are all true
S argues that r1 . . . r5, s, and t, taken together imply not-d
S concludes not-d, namely, 'What is loved by (all) the gods cannot be a definition of 'holy'
· Query: is this a good argument – especially, should we accept premises r1 . . . rn?
Fourth (final) try: "Holiness (and piety) are parts of what is lawful, right, just (i.e., species of the genus of lawful, right, just actions), namely that part of just, lawful, right action that involves attention to the gods, whereas the remainder of just, lawful, right action that involves service to humans." (12E – 13A)
· Queries:
1. What kind of resolution of the question 'What is piety?' do Socrates and Euthyphro arrive at by the end of the dialogue?
2. Is there any significance to the resolution or lack thereof? Does the resolution or lack thereof reveal something about the strengths and weaknesses of the Socratic Method?
What are the value and purpose of the elenchos?
for Socrates (or for the teacher)?
for the interlocutor (or for the student)?
Who can benefit from the Socratic method?
Everyone?
If not everyone, why not everyone -- who can't, and why can't they?
Query (Vlastos' "problematic"): How can the "elenchos" get beyond consistency in an interlocutor's set of beliefs to the truth?
· Socrates clearly aims to get at the truth in his "examinations" with interlocutors: e.g., Apology IC.
· But if his basic method is some form of reductio, then it looks like the best the method can achieve is consistency.
· But not all beliefs that are part of a consistent set are true. For example, the set of beliefs consisting of 'Cambridge is on Pluto' and 'Pluto is not on Mars' is consistent, but one of the beliefs is not true. Therefore, enhancing consistency is nowhere near a guarantor of truth.
Apology: Socrates on "wisdom" and the "examined life"
1. What "principled" "examined" defense does Socrates offer for the very striking claim, "the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being"? (Apology 38A)
2. What indication does Socrates give in the Apology about what he means by "the examined" (or, "unexamined") life?
3. Is Socrates' strong claim that "the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being" consistent with his explanation of why the Oracle at Delphi was correct to call Socrates the wisest man in Athens?:
"This investigation has led to my having many enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies, and I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and in this oracle he means to say that the wisdom of men is little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name as an illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go my way, obedient to the god, and make inquisition into the wisdom of anyone, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and this occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god." (Apology 23A-B)
4. From Socrates' explanation of why there was so much hostility to him -- leading him to be tried for a potentially (and, as it happened, actually) capital crime -- what general conclusion about wisdom are we entitled to draw? Is it that wisdom is unattainable by any human being? Is so strong a conclusion warranted from what Socrates tells us of his reaction to the statement by the oracle at Delphi?
5. Was Socrates a humanist?
6. What seems to be the role of religious faith and reason in Socrates' own beliefs and practices? Are faith and reason harmonious in Socrates' own beliefs and practices?
Sunday, November 02, 2008
Notes and Discussion Questions for Plato's Apology and Euthyphro
(prepared by Scott Brewer)
What exactly is the "Socratic method"?: the structure of the "elenchos" ("cross-examination")
1. Interlocutor asserts a definition of a virtue, d
2. Socrates secures agreement to further premises, q and r
3. Socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that q and r entail not-d
4. Socrates claims that not-d has been proved
Examples of Socratic Method: elenchoi in the Euthyphro
First try, first elenchos: "This what I'm doing here is holiness"
d: 'What E is doing' (prosecuting father) is a definition of 'holiness'
e: Many other things apart from what E is doing (prosecuting father) are also holy.
· Structure of the first elenchos (modus tollens reductio):
d is proposed by E
S elicits, If d then not-e [or, equivalently, if e then not-d]
S elicits e
S concludes, therefore, not-d
Second try, second elenchos: "What is dear to the gods is holy and what is not dear to the gods is unholy."
d: 'What is dear to the gods is holy and what is not dear to the gods is unholy' is a
definition of 'holy'.
r: Human beings get into angry disagreement (only) concerning what is right and
wrong, noble or disgraceful, good and bad. (7D)
s: Gods get into angry disagreement (only) concerning what is right and wrong,
noble or disgraceful, good and bad. (7E)
t: The same things are both hated and loved by the gods (as a group). (8a [because
some gods love X while other gods hate X, hence, their angry disagreement.])
u: The same things are holy and unholy.
· Structure of the second elenchos (modus tollens reductio)
d is proposed by E
S elicits r, s, t
S argues that if r, s, and t are true, then u is true
S argues that if u is true, then d is not true
S concludes not-d
Third try, third elenchos: "What all the gods love is holy, what all the gods hate is unholy" (and what they disagree about is both or neither? – see 9D - E)
d: What all the gods love is holy, what all the gods hate is unholy.
r1 . . . r5 (S explains the question by securing E's agreement to r1 . . . r5 : "Because
it's Xi it's an Xi thing.")
a thing is "a carried thing" (r1) because one carries it -- it's not the case that one carries it because it is a carried thing.
ditto for 'led' (r2), 'seen' (r3 ), 'done or undergone' (r4), 'loved' (r5) (10C [Those who love something do not love it because it's beloved, but it's beloved because they love it])
à Note that these are all participles, i.e., "verbal adjectives" (in both Greek and English).
s: what is holy is what is loved by all the gods because it's holy, not: what is holy
is holy because it's loved by the gods. (10E)
à Cf. the debate between "moral realism" and "moral relativism": an act is judged wrong because it is wrong, apart from judgment (realism) vs. an act is wrong because it's judged wrong.
à Basically, Socrates suggests, and Euthyphro agrees to, a "moral realist" position about holiness and the gods, rather than a moral relativist position.
t: what is loved by (all the) the gods is beloved because they love it, not: they love
it because it's beloved (10E);
cf. 10C, those who love something do not love it because it's "beloved," but it's "beloved" because they love it.
· Structure of the third elenchos (modus tollens reductio)
E proposes d as definition of 'holy'
S elicits, secures E's agreement that r1 . . . r5, s, and t are all true
S argues that r1 . . . r5, s, and t, taken together imply not-d
S concludes not-d, namely, 'What is loved by (all) the gods cannot be a definition of 'holy'
· Query: is this a good argument – especially, should we accept premises r1 . . . rn?
Fourth (final) try: "Holiness (and piety) are parts of what is lawful, right, just (i.e., species of the genus of lawful, right, just actions), namely that part of just, lawful, right action that involves attention to the gods, whereas the remainder of just, lawful, right action that involves service to humans." (12E – 13A)
· Queries:
1. What kind of resolution of the question 'What is piety?' do Socrates and Euthyphro arrive at by the end of the dialogue?
2. Is there any significance to the resolution or lack thereof? Does the resolution or lack thereof reveal something about the strengths and weaknesses of the Socratic Method?
What are the value and purpose of the elenchos?
for Socrates (or for the teacher)?
for the interlocutor (or for the student)?
Who can benefit from the Socratic method?
Everyone?
If not everyone, why not everyone -- who can't, and why can't they?
Query (Vlastos' "problematic"): How can the "elenchos" get beyond consistency in an interlocutor's set of beliefs to the truth?
· Socrates clearly aims to get at the truth in his "examinations" with interlocutors: e.g., Apology IC.
· But if his basic method is some form of reductio, then it looks like the best the method can achieve is consistency.
· But not all beliefs that are part of a consistent set are true. For example, the set of beliefs consisting of 'Cambridge is on Pluto' and 'Pluto is not on Mars' is consistent, but one of the beliefs is not true. Therefore, enhancing consistency is nowhere near a guarantor of truth.
Apology: Socrates on "wisdom" and the "examined life"
1. What "principled" "examined" defense does Socrates offer for the very striking claim, "the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being"? (Apology 38A)
2. What indication does Socrates give in the Apology about what he means by "the examined" (or, "unexamined") life?
3. Is Socrates' strong claim that "the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being" consistent with his explanation of why the Oracle at Delphi was correct to call Socrates the wisest man in Athens?:
"This investigation has led to my having many enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies, and I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and in this oracle he means to say that the wisdom of men is little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name as an illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go my way, obedient to the god, and make inquisition into the wisdom of anyone, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and this occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god." (Apology 23A-B)
4. From Socrates' explanation of why there was so much hostility to him -- leading him to be tried for a potentially (and, as it happened, actually) capital crime -- what general conclusion about wisdom are we entitled to draw? Is it that wisdom is unattainable by any human being? Is so strong a conclusion warranted from what Socrates tells us of his reaction to the statement by the oracle at Delphi?
5. Was Socrates a humanist?
6. What seems to be the role of religious faith and reason in Socrates' own beliefs and practices? Are faith and reason harmonious in Socrates' own beliefs and practices?
Saturday, August 2, 2008
Religious atheism? On Quaker "nontheism"
"Religious atheism" might seem like an oxymoron, but if you take "religion" in the more communal sense (rather than the epistemology-centered sense), it's hard to tell it apart from humanism. Though personally, I think it's clearest for humanists to avoid religious terminology rather than try to reclaim it.
That hasn't stopped me, however, from participating in the Quaker community (yes, Quakers still exist), where in some quarters it's acceptable not to believe in God. On our website nontheistfriends.org I recently posted the audio of a sort of debate between a prominent British nontheist Quaker and humanist by the name of David Boulton, and a prominent theistic Quaker named Chuck Fager, who directs a draft counseling center in North Carolina. This took place last month before a packed room at Friends General Conference, the annual North American gathering for theologically "liberal" Quakers.
The audio and a little context are found here.
Non-Quaker listeners might listen to the first few minutes and then skip to halfway though when the conversation turns to theism and atheism. (Most of the first half is about the question "Are Quakers a chosen people?" which comes from a Biblical frame of reference and may be less interesting to humanists.)
By the way, in case you're scratching your head over the term "nontheist," we use it mainly to avoid the negative connotations of the term atheist, though I personally am not bothered by them.
That hasn't stopped me, however, from participating in the Quaker community (yes, Quakers still exist), where in some quarters it's acceptable not to believe in God. On our website nontheistfriends.org I recently posted the audio of a sort of debate between a prominent British nontheist Quaker and humanist by the name of David Boulton, and a prominent theistic Quaker named Chuck Fager, who directs a draft counseling center in North Carolina. This took place last month before a packed room at Friends General Conference, the annual North American gathering for theologically "liberal" Quakers.
The audio and a little context are found here.
Non-Quaker listeners might listen to the first few minutes and then skip to halfway though when the conversation turns to theism and atheism. (Most of the first half is about the question "Are Quakers a chosen people?" which comes from a Biblical frame of reference and may be less interesting to humanists.)
By the way, in case you're scratching your head over the term "nontheist," we use it mainly to avoid the negative connotations of the term atheist, though I personally am not bothered by them.
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Law as Cruelty: Torture as an International Crime
Can torture ever be justified? This is just one of the issues tackled in the recent special issue of the Journal of International Criminal Justice entitled ‘Law as Cruelty: Torture as an International Crime’ (table of content).
Guest edited by Dr Jens David Ohlin and Prof George P. Fletcher, the sequence of articles in the special issue proceeds from the general definition of torture, then to defences for the crime of torture, and finally remedies under US and international law.
"Although there is already much work on the subject previously published, the Journal recognizes a need for unique approaches, with broad disciplinary foundations, to enrich the current legal analysis... the legal community is badly in need of serious research on the topic that is both international in scope and sophisticated in tenor. It is for this reason that the Journal has dedicated a special issue to the topic, in recognition of both the moral urgency of the topic and its legal complexity."
Guest edited by Dr Jens David Ohlin and Prof George P. Fletcher, the sequence of articles in the special issue proceeds from the general definition of torture, then to defences for the crime of torture, and finally remedies under US and international law.
"Although there is already much work on the subject previously published, the Journal recognizes a need for unique approaches, with broad disciplinary foundations, to enrich the current legal analysis... the legal community is badly in need of serious research on the topic that is both international in scope and sophisticated in tenor. It is for this reason that the Journal has dedicated a special issue to the topic, in recognition of both the moral urgency of the topic and its legal complexity."
Friday, June 27, 2008
Tuesday, June 24, 2008
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Childish superstition: Einstein's letter makes view of religion relatively clear
"Science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind." So said Albert Einstein, and his famous aphorism has been the source of endless debate between believers and non-believers wanting to claim the greatest scientist of the 20th century as their own.
A little known letter written by him, however, may help to settle the argument - or at least provoke further controversy about his views.
Due to be auctioned this week in London after being in a private collection for more than 50 years, the document leaves no doubt that the theoretical physicist was no supporter of religious beliefs, which he regarded as "childish superstitions".
Monday, May 12, 2008
Five people attended the meeting at the Harvard Club on May 10, 2008. We discussed in what ways and to what effect we “closet” ourselves as non-theists, i.e., fail to disclose or assert our humanist stances when the issue of religious faith arises. Other parallels were drawn between non-theism and minority sexual orientations, including the liberation of “coming out” as non-theists. We also discussed humanism (or the paucity thereof) in ethnic minority communities, especially African-American ones. The existence of a Black Humanists of Boston Meetup was announced, and relatedly, we discussed Anthony Pinn. The idea of showing DVDs about humanist topics and then discussing them, was presented. We considered various participants’ homes as venues.
In the course of describing our various religious (or non-religious) upbringings, one person posited that there are three types of non-theists: i) people who were indoctrinated successfully growing up and then became disillusioned, ii) people who grew up with religious instruction, but never believed it, and iii) people who were never burdened with the baggage of religious instruction or religious social groups. The first type is often still struggling to recover from indoctrination and disillusionment and identifies strongly with the “atheist” label, is wary of any discussion of spirituality because it recalls the dogmatic religious settings of their upbringing, and sees atheist groups as an unfortunate outgrowth of, and reaction against, religiosity in the broader society. The second type is less scarred than the first, but still quite concerned about defending against the social aggressions of religious people, and both the first two types are quite concerned about the political activities of religious people. The third type is less likely to identify with the atheist label, less concerned about traditional religions, and more interested in “humanist” spirituality and ethical discussion. The three types have different needs for humanist community.
We also touched on the influence of religious faith on policy decisions of elected officials. We considered both the possibilities that a) elected officials and politicians are as religious as they claim or b) elected officials refer to religious ideas merely to manipulate the public, without much personal faith. The second view was connected to the “neoconservative” assertion that the government should shore up religious faith to protect society against the corrupting effects of post-modernity. Those points led to an exchange about whether traditional religion is good for most people. Some took the view that religious faith alleviates suffering and provides meaning to most people, while others found such a perspective elitist and questioned the authenticity of religious belief for people with limited educational opportunity.
We closed with a challenge to provide an example of how our humanist principles affected a personal decision or situation. Some felt that their humanism had made it difficult to date people with religious beliefs or people who believed that social problems would solve themselves, without activism.
In the course of describing our various religious (or non-religious) upbringings, one person posited that there are three types of non-theists: i) people who were indoctrinated successfully growing up and then became disillusioned, ii) people who grew up with religious instruction, but never believed it, and iii) people who were never burdened with the baggage of religious instruction or religious social groups. The first type is often still struggling to recover from indoctrination and disillusionment and identifies strongly with the “atheist” label, is wary of any discussion of spirituality because it recalls the dogmatic religious settings of their upbringing, and sees atheist groups as an unfortunate outgrowth of, and reaction against, religiosity in the broader society. The second type is less scarred than the first, but still quite concerned about defending against the social aggressions of religious people, and both the first two types are quite concerned about the political activities of religious people. The third type is less likely to identify with the atheist label, less concerned about traditional religions, and more interested in “humanist” spirituality and ethical discussion. The three types have different needs for humanist community.
We also touched on the influence of religious faith on policy decisions of elected officials. We considered both the possibilities that a) elected officials and politicians are as religious as they claim or b) elected officials refer to religious ideas merely to manipulate the public, without much personal faith. The second view was connected to the “neoconservative” assertion that the government should shore up religious faith to protect society against the corrupting effects of post-modernity. Those points led to an exchange about whether traditional religion is good for most people. Some took the view that religious faith alleviates suffering and provides meaning to most people, while others found such a perspective elitist and questioned the authenticity of religious belief for people with limited educational opportunity.
We closed with a challenge to provide an example of how our humanist principles affected a personal decision or situation. Some felt that their humanism had made it difficult to date people with religious beliefs or people who believed that social problems would solve themselves, without activism.
Monday, April 28, 2008
Religion a figment of human imagination...
Humans alone practice religion because they're the only creatures to have evolved imagination.
That's the argument of anthropologist Maurice Bloch of the London School of Economics. Bloch challenges the popular notion that religion evolved and spread because it promoted social bonding, as has been argued by some anthropologists.
Instead, he argues that first, we had to evolve the necessary brain architecture to imagine things and beings that don't physically exist, and the possibility that people somehow live on after they've died.
Once we'd done that, we had access to a form of social interaction unavailable to any other creatures on the planet. Uniquely, humans could use what Bloch calls the "transcendental social" to unify with groups, such as nations and clans, or even with imaginary groups such as the dead. The transcendental social also allows humans to follow the idealised codes of conduct associated with religion.
"What the transcendental social requires is the ability to live very largely in the imagination," Bloch writes....
That's the argument of anthropologist Maurice Bloch of the London School of Economics. Bloch challenges the popular notion that religion evolved and spread because it promoted social bonding, as has been argued by some anthropologists.
Instead, he argues that first, we had to evolve the necessary brain architecture to imagine things and beings that don't physically exist, and the possibility that people somehow live on after they've died.
Once we'd done that, we had access to a form of social interaction unavailable to any other creatures on the planet. Uniquely, humans could use what Bloch calls the "transcendental social" to unify with groups, such as nations and clans, or even with imaginary groups such as the dead. The transcendental social also allows humans to follow the idealised codes of conduct associated with religion.
"What the transcendental social requires is the ability to live very largely in the imagination," Bloch writes....
Friday, April 25, 2008
If God Is Dead, Who Gets His House?
The fastest-growing faith in America is no faith at all. And now some atheists think they need a church.
Atheism’s great awakening is in need of a doctrine. “People perceive us as only rejecting things,” says Ken Bronstein, the president of a local group called New York City Atheists. “Everybody wants to know, ‘Okay, you’re an atheist, now what?’ ”...some atheists are taking seriously the idea that atheism needs to stand for things, like evolution and ethics, not just against things, like God. The most successful movements in history, after all—Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, etc.—all have creeds, cathedrals, schools, hierarchies, rituals, money, clerics, and some version of a heavenly afterlife. Churches fill needs, goes the argument—they inculcate ethics, give meaning, build communities. “Science and reason are important,” says Greg Epstein, the humanist chaplain of Harvard University. “But science and reason won’t visit you in the hospital.”...
Atheism’s great awakening is in need of a doctrine. “People perceive us as only rejecting things,” says Ken Bronstein, the president of a local group called New York City Atheists. “Everybody wants to know, ‘Okay, you’re an atheist, now what?’ ”...some atheists are taking seriously the idea that atheism needs to stand for things, like evolution and ethics, not just against things, like God. The most successful movements in history, after all—Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, etc.—all have creeds, cathedrals, schools, hierarchies, rituals, money, clerics, and some version of a heavenly afterlife. Churches fill needs, goes the argument—they inculcate ethics, give meaning, build communities. “Science and reason are important,” says Greg Epstein, the humanist chaplain of Harvard University. “But science and reason won’t visit you in the hospital.”...
Sunday, April 20, 2008
What Are The Odds Of Finding Extraterrestrial Intelligent Life?
ScienceDaily (Apr. 19, 2008) — Is there anybody out there? Probably not, according to a scientist from the University of East Anglia. A mathematical model produced by Prof Andrew Watson suggests that the odds of finding new life on other Earth-like planets are low, given the time it has taken for beings such as humans to evolve and the remaining life span of Earth...
Saturday, April 19, 2008
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
Aimé Césaire (1913 - 2008)
To go away.As there are hyena-men and panther-men, I would be a jew-man
A Kaffir-man
A Hindu-man-from-Calcutta
A Harlem-man-who-doesn't-vote
The famine-man, the insult-man, the torture-man you can grab
anytime, beat up, kill -- no joke, kill -- without having to account
to anyone, without having to make excuses to anyone
A jew-man
A pogrom-man
A Kaffir-man
A Hindu-man-from-Calcutta
A Harlem-man-who-doesn't-vote
The famine-man, the insult-man, the torture-man you can grab
anytime, beat up, kill -- no joke, kill -- without having to account
to anyone, without having to make excuses to anyone
A jew-man
A pogrom-man
Aimé Césaire died (June 25, 1913 - April 17, 2008). He was born in Martinique, a small overseas department of France, in the eastern Caribbean Sea. Most famous for his poems about the identity of the black people, he was also a politician (elected mayor of Fort-De-France from 1945 to 2001), an author and a humanist to heart.
More about Aimé Césaire:
More about Aimé Césaire:
- http://www.cesaire.org/
- http://books.google.com/books?&q=aime+cesaire
- Notebook of a Return to the Native Land (http://books.google.com/books?id=JzFt9S2RBakC)
More evidence showing elephants were aquatic
A brand new article in the renowned, peer-reviewed, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science provides more evidence for the fact that elephants were once aquatic. Our readers probably remember our previous article earlier this month on the same topic. There gotta be some greater design, I'm telling you! ;)
As explained by Greg Laden (biological anthropologist, Harvard alumn) here, the new study showed that the (stable) isotopes contained in the teeth of the elephants wandering around today, resemble those of aquatic and semiaquatic mammals once rulling the oceans.
En passant, Greg's reminds us of that earlier study (1999), investigating the ontogeny of the kidneys in elephants, during which the kidneys take on the characteristics that are found in aquatic mammals generally (which we elusively referred to in our earlier post).
As explained by Greg Laden (biological anthropologist, Harvard alumn) here, the new study showed that the (stable) isotopes contained in the teeth of the elephants wandering around today, resemble those of aquatic and semiaquatic mammals once rulling the oceans.
En passant, Greg's reminds us of that earlier study (1999), investigating the ontogeny of the kidneys in elephants, during which the kidneys take on the characteristics that are found in aquatic mammals generally (which we elusively referred to in our earlier post).
Friday, April 11, 2008
Retrospective: Sir Arthur C Clarke (1917-2008)
Retrospective, published in Science, about one of the greatest Sci Fi writer, a great humanistJoseph N. Pelton, John Logsdon
"Scientific giants give us powerful understanding of how nature works. Newton identified gravity; Curie provided knowledge of radioactivity; Einstein, the space-time continuum; Hubble, a yardstick to measure the size of the "Big Bang universe." Other powerful figures in human history contribute primarily by their insights into what might be. They span an incredibly broad range of art, literature, invention, and scientific inquiry. Leonardo Da Vinci is an obvious prototype, whose work and thoughts have transcended time. Sir Arthur C. Clarke was clearly one of these 'others.'" ...
"Scientific giants give us powerful understanding of how nature works. Newton identified gravity; Curie provided knowledge of radioactivity; Einstein, the space-time continuum; Hubble, a yardstick to measure the size of the "Big Bang universe." Other powerful figures in human history contribute primarily by their insights into what might be. They span an incredibly broad range of art, literature, invention, and scientific inquiry. Leonardo Da Vinci is an obvious prototype, whose work and thoughts have transcended time. Sir Arthur C. Clarke was clearly one of these 'others.'" ...
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- Religion a figment of human imagination...
- US outlaws genetic discrimination
- If God Is Dead, Who Gets His House?
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- What Are The Odds Of Finding Extraterrestrial Inte...
- Robots with human feelings.
- Aimé Césaire (1913 - 2008)
- More evidence showing elephants were aquatic
- Retrospective: Sir Arthur C Clarke (1917-2008)
- Scientists witnessed Darwin's theory of evolution
- Fundamental Truths
- I and My Brother Against My Cousin
- Martin Luther King Jr.'s death anniversary
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